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Gegenstand der Analyse dieses Papiers ist der Umfang von Policy-Innovationen
innerhalb des italienischen Arbeitsmarkts angesichts der wachsenden
Arbeitslosigkeit. Dabei geht es um die Art, wie öffentliche und private Akteure ihr
Routinehandeln zu verändern und neue Programme zu entwickeln versuchen, um
gegen die alarmierenden Veränderungen auf dem Arbeitsmarkt anzugehen.
Im Vordergrund stehen dabei die in der jüngsten Zeit geschlossenen Solidaritäts-
Abmachungen (bei denen es um Verträge mit flexibler und verkürzter  Arbeitszeit
geht), die sehr bewußt von Entscheidungsträgern eingeführt wurden, um
Entlassungen zu vermeiden und neue Einstellungen zu ermöglichen. Ein detaillierter
Vergleich zwischen den mehrheitlich praktizierten Standardansätzen in der
Arbeitsmarktpolitik und den neuen Arbeitsprogrammen der 90er Jahre zeigt deutlich
ein anhaltendes Setzen auf  alte Policy-Muster und ein niedriges Innovationsniveau
in neue Policy-Ansätze. Die Arbeitgeber halten an den alten Programmen fest, da sie
den Verlust von deren Anreizstrukturen befürchten. Ebenso sind öffentliche
Maßnahmen pfadabhängig vor dem Hintergrund des bestehenden
Institutionengefüges von Anreizen und Einschränkungen, eine Abhängigkeit, die
innovative Erfolge verhindert.Table of contents
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«History matters. It matters not just
because we can learn from the past
but because the present and the future
are connected to the past by the
continuity of a society’s institutions.»
(D.C. North 1990:vii)
1. Introduction
«One million more jobs» was the central slogan of Berlusconi’s
electoral campaign in March 1994. Both the right coalition, which
officially formulated the proposal, and the left coalition, denouncing its
lack of realism, recognised the political salience of unemployment.
Since 1992, Italy has experienced a substantial fall in employment.
While in the EC countries the employment increased by 2%, in Italy
more than double the jobs were lost in 1993 (- 4,8). In January 1995
unemployment reached the historical peak of 12,2%, but distributed
unevenly over territory: 22% in the South against 7,2% in the North.
Long-term unemployment also increased significantly, amounting to
7,6% of total unemployment (ISTAT 1995).
The employment trends of the 90s in fact seem to go in the
opposite direction of the 80s, when job creation, although insufficient
to keep pace with the growth of the labour force, was significantly
above the EC average. Between 1980 and 1991 total employment
rose by more than 1,5 million units, a yearly growth rate averaged
0,6% against 0,4% in the European Community as a whole (European
Economy 1993). This low cyclical sensitivity to economic activity and
to international output fluctuations is largely due to some structural
disadvantages which put the Italian labour market in a unique
economic and political condition compared to the European scenario.
The territorial, economic and social dualism between the South
and the North, the sectoral dualism between competitive and non-
competitive sectors, the low level of youth- and female employment
together with an under-institutionalised system of vocational training
make the Italian case a peculiar one. This peculiarity is enhanced by
a remarkable degree of social security which assures high income
protection, a result of the compensatory function of public spending.2
Consequences of this process are the well known huge public
deficit,  the persistence of high inflation (5,5% in May 95), the public
sector’s inefficiency, and the dominance of a culture of public
assistance, often turning into clientelism (La Palombara 1964;
Graziano 1974; Ferrera 1984).
The nineties, however, are a period of both hard economic
recession and of multiple transitions
1. Deep changes took place in the
social and in the political arena. The introduction of the majority
system, the new social pacts of ‘92 and ‘93, and the reform of
collective bargaining, are just examples of the attempt to create more
stability and introduce more rationality. Although they are preliminary
steps in a wider political learning process, they open new spaces of
action with direct repercussions on labour policy innovation.
The main purpose of this paper is to investigate the degree of
policy innovation within the Italian labour market, in a period of
tremendous unemployment, such as the one of the nineties. The
paper analyses the way public and private actors try to modify their
routines and to develop new programmes in order to tackle the
alarming transformations of the labour market.
Particular attention is given to solidarity contracts (i.e. working
time reduction), a new programme that was deliberately introduced to
avoid dismissals and to promote new hirings. A case study is
selected, Fiat’s last-round bargaining process where solidarity
contracts became a very controversial issue, supported by unions but
strongly refused by employers. The Fiat case helps to understand the
way social actors influence the policy process and try to pursue their
own interests, hampering the full implementation of innovations
brought in by decision makers. It is a privileged occasion which
permits to address the leading issue of radical policy innovation from
a more specific perspective.
The comparison between main stream labour policies and the new
labour programmes developed in Italy, starting in 1988, demonstrates
the salience of existing past policy schemes and the low degree of
                                                          
1 See, beside economic change, the political transformations that occurred in 1992, as a result of the
action of «Mani Pulite», which threw most of the ruling class out of office on grounds of corruption. It is
beyond the scope of this paper to analyse the deep political changes after the period of corruption
scandals.3
effective policy innovation. Even so-called «radical unemployment
programmes» turn out to be very conventional and to reveal the
legacies of past experiences. Actors stick to the «old» instruments, in
fear of losing the structure that they provide.
The failure of existing policies, confirmed by the persistence of
high unemployment seems therefore not to be sufficient to stimulate
substantial reform efforts. Policies are path-dependent: they are a
product of the particular institutional framework of incentives and
constraints that surrounds them. That is why they should be explained
on the basis of the structural and historical features in which they are
embedded. Institutional innovations are filtered by the existing
institutions -that is, always modified and adapted. Decision makers do
not autonomously choose new policies on the basis of their rationally
expected outcomes, but constantly have to bargain with interest
groups’ pressures and with the institutional framework in which their
strategies develop.
2
The analysis I suggest will therefore contrast with a certain group
of policy studies which tend to consider public policies as independent
variables capable of influencing and gradually transforming the
institutional setting (Lowi 1972; Richardson 1982; Richardson and
Jordan 1985; Dente and Regonini 1987; Jordan 1990). Taking
inspiration from recent neo-institutional contributions (Granovetter
1985; Granovetter and Swedberg 1992; Steinmo et al. 1992; Streeck
1992; 1994; Soskice 1994) I argue that institutions are more resilient
than policies and that institutional innovation is a more complex
phenomenon than the simple result of fixed causal relationships.
Studying institutional innovation therefore requires a detailed
investigation of the  multiple and dynamic links between politics,
history and policy.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly presents the
context and the historical development of Italian labour policies. The
dominance of passive policies for income support, the lack of job
creation programmes and the generosity of state subsidies emerge as
the main features. Section 3 focuses on policy innovations introduced
in the nineties in order to tackle increasing unemployment. Among
                                                          
2 The actors somehow adopt a logic of normative appropriateness (March and Olsen 1989)
conforming their strategies to the institutional constraints.4
them, particular attention is given to solidarity contracts and to the
last employment crisis at Fiat where solidarity contracts were a hotly
debated topic. The confrontation between the old and the new
instruments the actors choose to solve the crisis reveals the
incremental nature and the limited possibilities of change. Section 4
tries to explain the low degree of labour policy innovation by looking
at the characteristics of the Italian political and administrative system,
where new programmes appear to be selected on the basis of their
compatibility with core institutional imperatives. Section 5 develops
the argument of policies path-dependency, on the basis of the
information developed in the paper.
2. Context
High fragmentation and lack of coordination was always part and
parcel of Italian unemployment policies have. The policies varied
according to a large number of parameters: the time they were
introduced, the relevant legal procedures, the industrial sectors to
which they applied, the territorial level on which they were
implemented and the authority responsible for that. In general, they
are based on a very sectoral and incremental logic. They frequently
juxtapose and overlap and are entangled with other policy sectors,
such as invalidity pensions and early retirements, which, especially
during the seventies and the eighties, substituted for unemployment
insurance.
A brief historical perspective is needed for a better understanding
of this particularistic and contingent logic.
The Italian government was one of the first,  soon after the British
one, to introduce unemployment insurance in 1919. Yet despite, this
early institutional innovation, the level of insurance has remained very
low in comparison with other European countries
3. After the Second
World War a series of sequential and sectoral measures were
introduced in order to make up for this deficit.
In 1945 the system of unemployment policies was based on two
different instruments, temporary wage subsidies for industrial workers,
the so-called Cassa Integrazione Guadagni (Cig) scheme, and
                                                          
3 Only in 1985 did unions formally advance a proposal  for the augmentation of the insurance
subsidy.5
unemployment insurance to cover involuntary unemployment, both
insufficient to cope with the mass of unemployed people.
From the fifties to the seventies unemployment programmes
represented the lowest amount of the total public expense; fluctuating
from 2 to 4% (Ferrera 1984). Active programmes, which favoured the
entry of young people in the labour market, were completely lacking.
They did not become necessary during the following two decades
either when, thanks to the unexpected recovery of the national
economy, the problem of unemployment almost disappeared from the
political agenda. The government only committed itself to extend the
temporary wage subsidies year after year until they were transformed
into ordinary benefits
4.
It is therefore more appropriate to speak of labour policies (i.e.
programmes introduced by a public authority in response to a specific
policy problem) only from the beginning of the seventies, when the
number of the unemployed began to rise and the electoral salience of
the problem exploded on the political arena. The alarming
consequences of the international recession, which deeply perturbed
the macro-economic setting, forced the government to take immediate
initiatives.
Changed economic conditions coincided with the explosion of the
social conflicts provoked by union protests and strikes during the «hot
autumn». The temporary weakening of centre-left coalitions at the
beginning of the Vth legislature appeared balanced by the sudden
strengthening of trade unions, after the long years of silence and
exclusion from the political arena.
The most important pillar of the Italian labour policies system, the
extraordinary wage subsidies, which expanded upon the ordinary CIG
scheme, was not a deliberate innovation in response to 1968, the
symbolic date of social mobilisation.
Law 1115 introduces these extraordinary interventions for more
critical situations than those foreseen by ordinary ones, such as crisis-
ridden industrial sectors.
                                                          
4 It should also be noted that in  1949 a reform of the employment agencies took place,
characterized by the establishment of public labour agencies at the national and the provincial level. In
addition, an extension of the unemployment insurance to the agricultural sector was contemplated.6
The period between 1968 and 1973, witnessed a quantitative
explosion of labour measures -beside the extraordinary wage
subsidies of law 1115: the introduction of pre-pensions for some ad-
hoc categories, the establishment of a special fund (GEPI) for the
rescue of crisis firms and the extension of insurance to the building
sector (Regalia 1984).
The year 1970 also saw the creation of the Regional Order.
Training competencies were transferred from the state to the Regions
and some new instruments, which joined and intersected with the
existing national programmes, were created in order to cope with the
rising number of the unemployed at the local level.
In the same year the Workers’ Constitution (Statuto dei lavoratori)
was introduced, a big innovative step, which marked the end of the
state’s absence from the regulation of industrial relations. Particularly
worth mentioning is article number 3 where the creation of
employment commissions within the provincial labour registry offices
was made compulsory. These special commissions, mostly composed
of unions representatives, had to control the list of registered workers
and deliver the permit for hiring.
In the second half of the seventies the evolution of economic
policy making became more and more intertwined with political
events. The seriousness of economic problems (in the period of  the
two oil shocks) and the weakening of centre-left governments,
symmetric to the growth of the communist party at the local level,
urged the government to look for a grand coalition (the so called
«historical compromise» 1976-1979)  between the major political
forces of the country.
During this period of national solidarity collective of trilateral
bargaining was attempted. The notion -perhaps myth- of neo-
corporatism was quickly circulating in the public debate, fomented by
its prescriptive inspiration, and the wish to emulate the successful
economic performance of the North-European democracies became
stronger and stronger. Trade unions exchanged wage moderation
against labour policies and social reforms, above all for young people
belonging to depressed areas, such as the Mezzogiorno.
In particular, four important instruments were brought in: the law
for industrial restructuring, (law 677/1977), the law for young people7
employment (law 285/1979), the general law on vocational training
(law 845/1978) and the bill on the pensions reform.
On vocational training, the Regions were regarded as the
responsible institutions. The system was designed to fill the
mismatches between skill supply and labour demand. In practice,
however, the lack of communication with the public educational
system - regulated by the Ministry of Education -, the low intra- and
inter-regional coordination and the lack of financial resources had a
negative impact on the efficacy of the programmes and made of
Italian vocational training one of the main obstacles to employment
growth
5.
The corporatist experiments had a brief life: after only three years
the great coalition broke into pieces and the old centre-left alliances
came back with the new name of  «pentapartito» (five parties
coalition). Only in the middle of the eighties did more successful
trilateral bargaining take place.
At the beginning of the eighties industrial relations became highly
conflictual. Social peace, only just obtained in the seventies, was
suddenly broken: the high point of conflictuality was reached at the
biggest Italian industrial firm (FIAT), which unilaterally dismissed
almost 15.000 workers on the grounds of overcapacity. Subsequent
industrial action turned into a gigantic defeat for the unions which
appeared unable to counter business strategies. Ten years after the
«hot autumn» the power relations between labour and business had
completely turned around: the difficulties and inner contradictions of
the trade unions (supported by the communist party while contested
by the workers) were highlighted, while business associations were
expanding and regained the initiative in industrial relations.
These advances in the power of business were not disconnected
from the new phase of economic recovery that brought positive effects
on the Italian economy.
The 1980s were one of the most interesting periods in the history
of labour policies, since it was marked by two relevant phenomena:
the first was the restarting of corporatist agreements between the
government and the social actors, deliberately adopted to reach
                                                          
5 More generally, Italy has a low level of general educational attainment compared to the other
OECD countries. In 1988, particularly in the Mezzogiorno, fewer than 25% of the population had more
than a basic secondary education (Rhodes 1995, 23).8
consensual economic and income policies; the second was the
introduction of deregulation programmes for the labour market.
The law 864/1984, translating the contents of corporatist
agreements, introduced three new instruments aimed at boosting
flexibility in labour contracts and working times: part-time jobs, work
and training contracts and solidarity contracts. Part time work was
considerably extended in the service sector, in order to respond to the
increasing number of female workers. Work and training contracts
were two-years contracts for young people under 29 which offered
social contribution discounts to employers and a variable wage to the
workers. Work had to be combined with on the job training. Solidarity
contracts were a form of working time reduction which included job
sharing and provided a subsidy for the lost salary;  they were never
implemented until 1993 when a new law completely redesigned their
main characteristics.
At the end of the eighties, the list of mainstream labour policies
can be summarised as follows (Table 1.).
Mainstream  labour policies
    Income
Support Policies
·  Unemployment insurance  (1919; 1986)
·  Ordinary wage subsidies: i.e. ordinary Cig
scheme (1945)
·  Extraordinary wage subsidies: i.e.
  extraordinary Cig scheme (1968)
·  Early retirements  (1981)
·  Solidarity contracts  (1984)
·  Block of collective hiring  (1977)
     Active
Policies
·  Work and training contracts  (1984)
·  Vocational training regulation (1978)
·  Part time working  (1984)
·  Apprenticeship  (1955; 1987)
      Table 1: “Mainstream labour policies at the end of the 80’s”
In sum, it is important to remark that the whole system of income
support policies at the end of the eighties (when unemployment9
appeared still tolerable) was built around the functioning of the wage
subsidies fund (the so-called Cig scheme), an unorthodox policy
compared to other European countries. This is a very generous and
flexible instrument, composed of ordinary and extraordinary payments.
Ordinary wage benefits foresee compensation of earnings in case of
temporary interruption of the firm’s activities (companies with more
than 15 employees), for a maximum of three consecutive months,
providing 80% of the income. The fund is located and administered by
the state (Istituto nazionale della previdenza sociale); employers
contributions vary between 1,90 and 2,20% of incomes on the basis of
the size of firm. In addition, users of  the ordinary Cig scheme pay 8%
of compensation paid to their employees (4% in companies with less
than 50 employees).
Extraordinary wage subsidies were introduced, as already argued,
in order to respond to the situations of industrial crisis and
restructuring. They are a veritable bulwark against unemployment,
almost unique in Europe for their generosity and duration. That is why
they are frequently asked instead of ordinary measures, transforming
their original structural connotation into a cyclical one, related to the
conjuncture. In case of economic difficulties extraordinary
interventions can be extended for a maximum of 1 year; while in the
case of industrial restructuring up to 2 years, which can be extended
until a maximum of 4 years. Wage subsidies contribute 80% of gross
income; they are mostly paid by public money through annual
transfers, calculated in the financial law. Companies pay 0.60% and
employees 0.30%. Users additionally pay 4,5% of the wage
replacement benefit (3,0% in firms with less than 50 employees). After
2 years of benefits this last contribution  doubles (Bentivoglio 1994).
In both ordinary and extraordinary interventions employers do not pay
social security contributions.
The other social shock absorbers played a subsidiary role: they
were very rarely used, except for cases in which the possibility of
applying for the Cig scheme was over. Curious is the case of solidarity
contracts, which, as mentioned before, were not demanded at all in
their original version.
In the group of active labour policies the most significant instrument
was work -and- training contracts. Part time work was used almost10
exclusively by women: in 1990, 75% of those working part-time were
woman. Even higher was the percentage of women turning their full
time work into part time, most frequently in the sector of services.
Active policies played a minor role anyway compared to income
support subsidies. The whole system was lopsided because of the
logic of public assistance which provided for great  income protection
without boosting job creation. Social shock absorbers, particularly the
Cig supplementary fund, are in fact instruments of resource allocation
and distribution that did not incite any active creation of jobs. Policies
are at the same time regulative and distributive: they define a
regulatory framework for the actors and at the same time give out
benefits and resources (Regalia and Regini 1994).
Fig.1. Unemployment in Italy and in EC countries, 1978/1996
“Source: OECD Economic Outlook, 56, 1994: A23”
The state, although active, is not a prominent institutional actor in
the labour market. The Ministry of Labour (not rarely with his under-
secretary) is used to directly intervening in the social agreements
giving and receiving resources and benefits. During the tripartite
labour accords in 1983 and 1984, for instance, labour policies were
exchanged with tax allowances and special investments in the South.
As the recession worsened in 1988 (as opposed to the EC average;
see Fig.1), doubts began to creep in and policy makers wondered
whether the traditional system of unemployment policies was still11
adequate. The need for innovation in the labour policies moved to the
centre stage in the policy debate. The dimensions of the public deficit,
the level of unemployment, surpassing 11%, and the gradual
termination of public funds, made government aware of the necessity
for deep changes.
3. Labour policy innovations in the nineties
In the nineties changes took place in three different but related,
directions: deregulation of employment conditions, drawing on
lessons, sometimes delayed (Haas 1992; Rose 1991; Regonini 1993),
from the Anglo-Saxon experiments of the eighties; institutional
reforms and qualification policies; and working time reduction.
These programmes were qualitatively innovative at the national
level and were supposed, at least in the words of their proponents, to
be capable of significantly reducing unemployment.
3.1. Deregulation of employment conditions
The core objective of deregulation policies is to affect the
protective nature of labour policies in a country where labour market
has hitherto been heavily regulated. The national employers’
association (Confindustria) had always complained about the rigidity
of the Italian labour market. The employers association found support
among well-known economists and academic professors whose
opinions were gathered in the most prestigious Italian economic
newspaper, “Il Sole 24 ore”, sponsored by the Confindustria. Even
though flexibility is traditionally employers’ philosophy, the unions,
worrying about the widespread evasion of regulatory norms, did not
fight the movement.
Law 223/91 (Norms on wage subsidies fund, mobility,
unemployment benefits, EC directives and other measures for the
Labor market) introduced three substantial innovations: it redesigned
the system of social shock absorbers, thus modifying the whole set of
passive policies; it altered the procedures of placement introducing the
so-called «nominative call» instead of the compulsory call; and it
recognised collective dismissals as a possible solution to firms’ crisis
situations. The introduction of a new instrument, the mobility insurance
(a longer form of early retirement), along with the modification of the12
beneficiaries and of the duration of the extraordinary Cig scheme
should also be noted.  But it is in relation to the hiring procedures that
this law was everywhere welcomed as a liberalising step, because of
the dismantling of the public guarantees inaugurated in 1949 (law
264).
The reform of the forties had established the public monopoly on
the management of the demand and supply of labour, by making
workers’ hirings dependent on a compulsory list. Law 221 introduces,
on the contrary, the principle of free choice and, in so doing, widens
the employers’ space of action. The removal of the block to collective
firing is again to the employers’ advantage.
More recently, following the tripartite labour accord between the
government and the social actors in July 1993, law 236/93 (Urgent
interventions for employment support) introduces a series of rules
aimed to extend the instruments of income protection, as a
consequence of the negative conjuncture. It introduced an exceptional
employment fund for the period ‘93/’95, of extraordinary interventions
for the Mezzogiorno, and the augmentation of employment insurance.
As for job creation, law 451/94 regulates the so-called “public
utility works” (workfare). Public administrations and some private
organisations, identified by the Ministry of Labour, are allowed to
promote projects for works of public interest in some innovative
sectors such as cultural goods, environmental protection and public
services.
During the government of Berlusconi some other measures were
taken, though to a lesser extent than the electoral promises. A
premium was introduced for young employers starting new
enterprises: they are allowed to choose an alternative fiscal regime  (2
Million liras for the first year, 3 Million for the  second, 4 Million for the
third), which substitutes for all the existing taxes except for the IVA
(added-value tax). The premium, moreover, is accompanied by some
hiring incentives: among them a fiscal bonus of 25% of the gross
income of the new employees.
Among the proposals not yet being implemented, but present on
the agenda of at least the last three governments (Ciampi, Berlusconi,
Dini), we find the notorious issue of  ad interim jobs, which would
permit employers to rent workers from specialised agencies (following
the French example). Now the proposal is near to realisation, since it
has become a central issue of both the last bill of Labour Minister
Treu and of the Labour Commission at the Chamber of Deputies.13
3.2. Institutional reforms and qualification programmes
In the years 1992/93 the government and the social actors
undertook a series of non-stop negotiations which concluded with the
tripartite labour accord of the 23rd  July 1993 which can rightly be
considered as the most innovative step in the Italian industrial
relations since the Workers’ Statute (1970) and the experiments of
concerted action in the eighties. In the face of rising unemployment
and slow economic growth, severe solutions were proposed: the
abolition of the automatic wage-indexation clause, the reform of
collective bargaining, the specification of bargaining themes and of
the responsible institutions. (Rapporto ‘93-’94). The agreement aims
to keep wage increases within the projected rate of inflation.
The new structure of collective bargaining is organised on the
basis of two levels of bargaining: the national level (contratto
collettivo nazionale di lavoro) and the plant- or territorial  level. The
reform intends, on the one side, to eliminate the chaos of overlapping
levels of bargaining that have hitherto impaired Italian industrial
relations; on the other, to respond through higher sensibility to local
unemployment crises.  The national level is now supposed to set
general standards on the determination of salaries, and leave the
regulation of specific contents to decentralised bargaining. The
agreement also introduces a specific iter of tripartite confrontations
based on two annual meetings: the first, in May, concerning the
objectives of the budget policies and the annual employment trends;
the second, in September, on the regulation of income policies before
the approval of the financial law. A special Observatory is established
with the purpose of controlling prices dynamics.
Beside the strategies of wages moderation, within the same
agreement, qualification policies and vocational training gain a
relevant space. A reorganisation of the apprenticeship system is
sought, in order to suit the different firms’ exigencies, and work and
training contracts are encouraged. In the law 451/94,  following the
agreement, the age of the beneficiaries is extended (16-32) and a
clearer classification is outlined between contracts for the acquisition
of high and intermediate skills, and contracts that are generally aimed14
to favour the professional entry of young people into the Labour
market.
3.3. Solidarity contracts
Working time reduction is an important instrument in the Italian
labour market; it is encouraged in at least three different ways. The
first one is given by the Cig scheme in which working time can be
temporarily reduced from 80% until 0%. The second one is part-time
working to which Italian firms have increasingly resorted in the
nineties. The third form of shorter-hours working is represented by
solidarity contracts, a very different instrument compared to the
others: workers accept to reduce working time in order to save jobs.
Solidarity contracts can be applied to all the categories of workers (as
the term solidarity suggests) and works can be shared.
Solidarity contracts were introduced in 1984 (law 864), on the
wave of enthusiasm following the national corporatist agreement
between the government and the social actors in 1983, with the
explicit purpose of boosting labour demand and of tackling youth
unemployment in a period of rapid technological transformation.
Trade unions, particularly the centre-moderate union (CISL), have
always struggled for the introduction of solidaristic instruments to
cope with unemployment (“Work less to let all work”, drawing lesson
from the French philosopher Guy Aznar
6). This was of course
anathema to the employers who have always feared the repercussions
of work sharing on the inner organization of companies. In 1983,
however, unions exchanged wage moderation  for the recognition and
the regulation of work sharing.
Solidarity contracts are a form of working time reduction (from
20% upwards), requiring previous agreements between the firm and
the unions. Two kinds can be distinguished: internal and external
contracts. The former, also called «defensive contracts», are used
inside the company to avoid dismissals through higher internal
mobility; the latter contemplate work sharing in order to create new
employment.
For “defensive contracts” the Ministry of Labor provides workers
and employees (neither middle managers nor managers) for wage
compensation benefits amounting to 50% of the lost work (Bentivoglio
                                                          
6 The brief essay of G. Aznar, translated into Italian in 1994 with the title Lavorare meno per
lavorare tutti, has had great success.15
1994), for a period of 24 months. If the reduction of working time is
higher than 20%, employers’ social security contributions are
additionally reduced by 25%, (30% in the South), rising to 40% when
the working time reduction is higher than 30%. The beneficiaries are
industrial and trade companies with more than 100 employees.
For external contracts, employers receive, for each new hire,
contributions equal to 15% of the income for the first year, 10% for
the second and 5% in the third year. When employers hire young
workers (15-29) through working hours reductions, they receive the
same insurance and pensioning treatments as for the apprenticeship.
Studying solidarity contracts is particularly worthwhile because of
three reasons:
·   for more than ten years working hours reductions were very
rarely demanded, whereas the Cig subsidies fund was increasingly
utilised;
·   up until now the only type of contracts which have been
exclusively made use of are the first, the defensive ones; no active
contracts exist;
·   in the 90’s the situation radically changed and working time
reductions suddenly jump onto the political agenda and in public
debate becoming an hotly debated issue.
Today these measures are more and more widespread: in 1993
the government spent 12 Billion liras for solidarity contracts. Requests
of working hours reductions for 1994 reached a total amount of 10
Billion liras, far beyond the forecasted sum
7 (inforMISEP, 1994)
8.
For about ten years solidarity contracts, which require preliminary
intra-firm collective bargaining, were not part of the official policy
paradigm
9; deep changes only occurred after the introduction of law
223 in 1993, nearly ten years later. These changes did not take place
as a consequence of another social pact (23 July 1993) between
                                                          
7 The current Labor Minister, Tiziano Treu,  is now trying to come up with other types of funds.
8 More in detail, in February 1994, in the engineering sector 55.000 workers are involved in
solidarity contracts; among them, 30.000 are metallurgists and mechanics (Alenia, Piaggio, Olivetti,
Iveco, Italtel, Fiat) and 10.000 are textile workers. The use of solidarity contracts has permitted to avoid
20-25.000 redundancies. Lombardy is the Region with the highest numbers of solidarity contracts: 139 for
19.000 workers (D’Aloia and Magno 1994).
9 It is worth noting that the law regulating working time dates back to 1923 and establishes a
maximum limit of 48 hours per week. Since then, several proposals were made to change it, but none was
formalized.16
unions, employers and government, where incentives for employers
played a prominent role.
In the fifth article of this law three substantial innovations are
introduced, valid until the end of ‘95: firstly, the benefits are elevated
from 50% to 75% of the salary lost as a consequence of working
hours reductions; secondly, employers benefit from a contribution
equal to one quarter of the non due-salary, corresponding to the
number of reduced hours. Last but not least, greater flexibility is
promoted by a provision that the reduction of time can be based on
daily, as well as weekly, monthly and annual hours.
As a result of these  modifications it is rather obvious to
understand why the new instruments began to spread across many
companies (Iveco, Italtel, Ilva), and ended up next to the other labour
programmes introduced in the same period. (Table 2.)
In 1994 new arrangements introduced further significant changes.
It is at this point that the strategies of the government and the
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Table 2. “Unemployment policies in the 90s”17
3.3.1. Case Study: FIAT
The Fiat crisis in November 1993, with the dismissal of nearly
16.000 workers on the grounds of overcapacity, shows how the
Labour market can effectively be described as a complex system of
regulation where public and private actors interact. The history of
solidarity contracts and of their legislative evolution is strongly related
to the disposition of big firms to accept them.
In August 1990 Fiat told the unions that after years of great
success (1989 was a record year for sales) it was forced to have
recourse to ordinary wage subsidies. Firm management thought the
crisis was of a cyclical nature; the strategic line adopted was therefore
so-called «middle-ray navigation» (i. e. incremental adjustments),
based on the gradual but continuous use of ordinary wage subsidies,
without any drastic solution. Essentially the firm waited for the
favourable market to change. Unions agreed with this strategy,  since
the absence of  more definitive measures allowed social tensions to
be contained. The «middle ray navigation» continued for the whole of
1991. In the meantime foreign automobile industries announced deeper
restructuring plans. In 1992 Fiat realised it faced not only an external
crisis in terms of economic recession, but its own internal crisis, in
terms of declining market shares and a budgetary deficit. At the same
time the new technological investments planned for Melfi resulted in
overcapacity. A reorganisation process was required and three plants
were quickly closed: Maserati (where 49% is owned by Fiat), Desio and
Chivasso. At this moment, unions were struggling against any kind of
layoff. The state redundancy fund was once again being demanded,
even though temporarily, since law 223/91 established a maximum of
52 consecutive weeks. The situation exploded in June 1993 when all
the available bonuses came to an end and when budget constraints
forced Romiti to go to Mediobanca for re-capitalisation. The transition
from cyclical to structural crisis was marked formally on the 22nd of
June 1993 when Fiat officially announced the need to resort to
extraordinary  wage subsidies. Bimonthly examinations of market
trends were also conducted in order to reach more flexibility in the
application of extraordinary benefits.
A second phase, faster but more serious, started in November
1993 (curiously simultaneous with the VW agreement on the 4-day18
week) at the Ministry of Labour. Fiat presented a restructuring plan,
forecasting massive layoffs, immediate closing of the Sevel Campania
and Arese (ex Alfa Romeo) plants, and, for the very first time,
dismissal of white collar workers. Unions asked for inter-plant
redeployment and they officially demanded work sharing to avoid
firings.
The bargaining table therefore opened with positions that were far
apart: on the employers’ side, Cig subsidies at 0-hours (that is:
dismissals) and eventually inscription on the mobility lists
10; on the
workers’ side, work sharing and industrial restructuring.
The strategies were so incompatible that the Ministry of Labour
was immediately called for as an arbitrator. It is important to mention
that the minister, Gino Giugni, is a respected professor of labour law,
and internationally famous as one of the fathers of the Workers’
Statute
11. In December ‘93 he officially announced direct
governmental intervention and the postponement of the Cig subsidies
at 0-hours, forecasted from the following January.
Notwithstanding the intervention of the minister and, later, of
Prime Minister Ciampi himself in a meeting on the possibility of
introducing the production of electric cars to re-industrialise old
plants, the negotiations were suddenly halted in the middle of January
1994. The interruption, probably initiated by the company, was in fact
the result of the interaction of the different strategies: Fiat did not
intend to renounce its objectives and the unions did not consider the
existing proposals acceptable. The Minister of Labour, even though he
had attempted to find a consensual solution, was forced to stop in the
face of the irreconcilable positions of the social actors.
After nearly a month of suspension the bargaining process started
again and on the 24th of February it was officially concluded through
a workers’ referendum. The hot climax of the general political
elections (Giugni himself was candidate for the «progressist coalition»
in Turin) favoured a quick  termination.
                                                          
10 The so-called “mobility procedure” is a form of early retirement offering the workers the
possibility of being deployed on some employment lists, in case of future jobs. The word mobility stands
for the worker’s eventual redeployment from one job to another.
11 More and more frequently the role of the Labour Minister is attributed to respected technicians
(mainly coming from the academic world) and not to politicians. That was the case with Giugni, and it is
now the case with Treu, the current Labour Minister.  They are both professors of  labour law and
industrial relations, and are both very close to the unions.19
Why was this outcome negotiated instead of unilaterally imposed
as the mass-dismissals of 1980? The state played a central role in
this process, by providing legislative backing for the negotiations.
Among this was:
·   a specific agreement between the government and the firm,
including direct public interventions in favour of the automobile
industrial sector, such as financial aid for research projects on the
production of electric cars, introduction of a special commission on
industrial development at the Ministry of Transport, and extraordinary
subsidies for the Sevel-Campania plant restructuring;
·   the introduction of a decree (40/1994), soon after the
interruption of the bargaining, which encouraged the use of  solidarity
contracts and made them compatible with Cig subsidies. In other
words, the law welcomed the requests of employers and at the same
time changed the original nature of solidarity contracts.
The final result was a mixture of four instruments, where
innovative programmes overlapped with mainstream policies: 6.500
early retirements (for the first time for 2.800 white collars); 2.200
mobility insurances; 4.100 extraordinary Cig subsidies; 3.500
solidarity contracts (only for blue-collars)
12.
The role of the government appeared to be crucial. Not only did
solidarity contracts become a legitimised part of the policy paradigm
(Hall 1989; 1993) only after concerted social pacts, but their
conditions depended on the government direct intervention.
4.  Institutional dynamics
The reason why in the eighties solidarity contracts were not demanded
at all, is related to the functioning of the existing mainstream policies,
in particular of the Cig  scheme. As mentioned above, the preference
for this instrument was easily explained by the generosity and the
flexibility of the subsidies, which mostly rested on the state’s shoulders.
Solidarity contracts thus became a plausible alternative when the high
cost of unemployment benefits stimulated authorities to look for less
                                                          
12 In regard to solidarity contracts, in Arese (Milan) 1.500 jobs are concerned with 4.500 workers
(Camuffo and Volpato 1994).20
expensive instruments. In the Fiat plants employers agreed to introduce
work sharing mainly because the possibility of demanding wage
subsidies was running out.
The exclusive use of “defensive contracts”, restricted to protecting
existing jobs instead of creating jobs, was consistent with the
institutional features of the Italian labour policies system: the culture
of the public assistance, the prevalence of passive policies for income
support and the fear for redistributive programmes hindered a pro-
active attitude towards external challenges. A vicious circle enhanced
the protection of the “already-protected” and the continued exclusion
of those “outside” the system.
It is therefore possible to seek the political causes to the particular
development of solidarity contracts and of labour policy innovations in
general in the low compatibility of the new programmes with existing
institutional imperatives.
Four elements stand out as particularly relevant. They can be
considered on the one side as lock-in effects (Arthur 1989; North
1990), hindering the full development of radical programmes, on the
other, as “spaces of opportunity” permitting unusual (even random)
courses of action. They have a structural nature, that is, that they do
not depend on the “incompetence” of institutional actors, but, rather,
they are historically rooted and thus capable of affecting the degree of
innovation and learning in the labour market (Gualmini 1995). I
referred to the bundle between private and public interests and the
extensive intervention of the state in the regulation of the labour
market
13; the particularistic nature of labour legislation; the weakly
institutionalised system of industrial relations; and the «cultural»
obstacles to innovation.
The development of labour policy innovation appears to be strictly
dependent on the political strategies of interest associations and on the
kind of relation they have with the government. It is not possible to
understand the historical evolution of Italian labour programmes without
taking into consideration unions’ and employers’ strategic goals and
their capacity of lobbying on behalf of their interests. Labour market
                                                          
13 That seems to be the biggest difference with the Volkswagen negotiations in November 1993,
where on the basis of Tarifautonomie the social actors were able to regulate themselves.21
policies are the result of the power exchanges and of the negotiations
between public and private actors, in dynamic and unstable policy
networks characterised by conflictual games that never approach a
zero-sum (Crozier and Friedberg 1977). It is not a rational calculus,
the maximisation of individual preferences, that drives the exchanges
between the actors, but a political rationality, that also has the implicit
goal of assuring the actors’ long-term organisational survival and
future identities.
From the «national solidarity» government to the neo-corporatist
agreements of the seventies and the eighties, to the new social pacts
of the nineties, we witnessed in continuous attempts of consensual
trilateral regulation, characterised by micro-political exchanges and
clientelistic compliance, that allow to perpetuate a policy making
process where resources and incentives are distributed and shared
out (Brunetta 1993). That is why the intervention of the state is always
called for: its role is essential not to directly promote the formulation
of new programmes, but to guarantee the functioning of the whole
mechanism.
The introduction of innovative labour policies (solidarity contracts,
reform of collective bargaining, qualification policies, deregulation of
employment conditions) is bargained between the state and the
groups. This pattern of interest intermediation reflects the extension
of the public hand into the economic sector and, at the same time, the
difficulty of the private actors to reach autonomous agreements (as,
for instance, would be the case in German industrial relations).
Instead of underlining the strength of public institutions, the state’s
role is evidence of their weakness and their penetration by organised
interests.
The permeability of the political system is moreover confirmed by
the redundant and particularistic nature of Labour legislation,
fragmented and segmented according to a multitude of criteria (what
are called leggine: small laws)
 14. The jungle of laws, bills and decrees,
responding to the cyclical demands of the actors involved, emphasises,
on the one hand, the lack of coordination that characterises the
                                                          
14 The Italian model can be placed in the opposite position compared to the German case, where the
labour legislation is collected within the AFG scheme which provides for coordination and general
standards.22
administrative system; on the other, it provides for high flexibility and
high sensitivity towards local exigencies
15.
In the FIAT case the bargaining process was successfully solved
when the firm decided to accept solidarity contracts, after they were
declared compatible with mainstream wage subsidies. In other words,
a law was made for them to accept it. This strongly underlines the ad
hoc  nature of that legislation, which addressed the interests of
business.
However, the incremental evolution of laws and decrees outside of
a general framework tends to frustrate any effort of radical reform
16.
This is even more evident for qualification policies where public
decisions mix with collective bargaining agreements giving rise to
demarcation conflicts.
Widespread public intervention in the Labour market, underlined
by the torrential nature of labour law, seems to compensate for the
low institutionalisation of industrial relations (Lange and Regini 1987).
There is not a legislative framework regulating the relationships
between labour and business. This is also a legacy from the past.
When trade unions were reconstructed soon after the Second World
War, their internal structure, their resources and their functioning
were strictly dependent on political parties activities. Gatekeeping by
the parties substantially obstructed the organisational development of
unions and exasperated their ideological fragmentation
17.
This is particularly true at the national level; while things are
different at the decentralised level, where active voluntarism,
frequently accompanied by the escape from the general standards
fixed by collective bargaining, develops rather quickly (Regini 1995;
Regalia and Regini 1994). In general, however, the lack of
homogeneous and co-ordinated action is a major issue.
                                                          
15 The high fragmentation of legislation is not an exclusive characteristic of this policy sector, as Di
Palma (1977) has widely explained.
16 In addition, the characteristics of the political system do not favour  coordination. On the one
part, the instability of governments can not assure, because of their limited tenure periods, the introduction
of national policy guidelines; on the other, the fragmentation of legislation emphasizes the
“personalization” of the issues. It is quite obvious, for instance, that solidarity contracts have had an easier
life under labour ministers close to the unions, such as Giugni and now Treu.
17 At the national level Italian unions are splitted into three different organizations: the CGIL, the
biggest one, traditionally linked to the major opposition party (PCI, now PDS), the CISL the center-
moderate union linked with the ex- christian-democratic party, and the UIL having a centre-liberal
connotation and linked with minor parties.23
Italian trade unions are complex organisations. Each federation is
organised according to two different dimensions that often combine:
the industrial dimension and the territorial dimension. Unions find it
hard to develop unitary strategies, above all when they have to
assume a political role before the government and the employers. It is
important to remember that one of the reasons why solidarity
contracts in their original version have not been accepted for so long
is the condition of previous collective bargaining they required.
Even though during the «hot autumn» unions had the power to
influence the political arena, along with employers’ strategies, from
the end of the seventies they never benefited from ‘allies in power’
who might have been more ideologically disposed to their requests
(Reyneri 1990).
Despite the low institutionalisation, however, in 1993 the
government and the social actors reached an important agreement
that seemed to open a new era in the industrial relations, build around
bargaining and coordination between the parties.
The fourth institutional dimension which has an impact on the
development of innovative policies is of a cultural nature; it relates to
the long-established tradition of stable full-time jobs in the Italians’
way of life. The lack of job mobility, or rather the fear for new kinds of
work organization, seems to mean that radical changes in the
workplace have high costs for the individuals’ way of life. Dividing
jobs, working less than «normal» times, encouraging inter-job
mobility, goes against the traditional proclivity for stability. Particularly
noteworthy here is that the majority of the Italian labour force works in
the public administration, where protection and immobility are central
prerogatives. The typical propensity for full-time work (the so-called
«myth of the guarantee») obstructs the way to unorthodox policy
innovation, such as work sharing and high working time flexibility
would represent for the Italian case.
Besides, the mainly juridical and formal culture of Italian public
administrators tends to hinder effective radical reforms. The
bureaucratic ethos embodied by civil servants tends to favour the
phenomenon of goal displacement: target orientations are substituted
by the compliance to legal norms in generic and abstract acts and
decrees, with minor effectiveness. If the organisational properties of the24
administrative institutions show high continuity with those of the VIII
century’s «State of Law», it is easy to understand how hard must be
the way for innovation and how sharp the distances between the new
policy challenges of the modern state and the kind of interventions
which are being enacted (Freddi 1989). Bureaucrats tend to act like
judges who apply the law to the reality, mainly worrying about the
formal procedures rather than about substantive contents
18. The
inefficiency of the Italian public administration slows down the
capacity of attaining programmatic goals. That is why passive old
policies (social shock absorbers) tend to prevail: they show higher
compatibility with institutional constraints.
If we examine in detail the amount of public expense for labour
market policies, the hypothesis is confirmed. First, the Italian total
percentage is among the lowest in Europe (1,8% against 4,2% in
Germany, 3% in France, 4% in Spain); second, more than half of this
percentage is composed of income support subsidies (Employment
Outlook 1994). Active policies, more suitable to erode structural
unemployment (which is independent from aggregate demand and
from the level of economic activity), are still a minority.
5. Conclusion: policies’ path-dependency
Policy failure, that is, high unemployment persistence, has not been
sufficient, itself, to stimulate radical reform efforts. Institutions have
their own interests, which sometimes become constraints for policy
innovation. Most of the innovative programmes examined above
appears to suffer from a sort of institutional inertia which impairs their
full development. The higher the degree of innovation, the higher the
pain.
The weakness of public institutions and their penetration by private
interests groups; the distributive character of public intervention, the
fragmented nature of labour legislation and the traditional rigidity of the
Italian labour market tend to divert the path of policy innovation like
work sharing and deregulation. The institutional framework of
                                                          
18 According to the following argument: «quod non est in actis non est de hoc mundo» (Mortara
1981, 142).25
incentives and constraints is, in fact, more compatible with passive
income support policies that were successful in the past and that tend
to be reiterated in the present along with the set of incentives they
can offer.
Work sharing provided an excellent case on which to build this
argument. At FIAT, solidarity contracts were accepted by employers
only when it was clear that they could be accompanied by old wage
subsidies and by some appealing compensations. As a consequence
they lost their original function and connotation.
Even if the model now enjoys widespread acceptance, it is not
likely to be extended at the national level, because of the various
constraints identified. It seems much more probable, as current trends
show, that its development will strictly depend on the local decisions
of the different companies. Each company prefers to bargain for its
specific kind of contracts, according to its own production
requirements. The segmentation of the labour market and the regional
differences, instead of encouraging national patterns of innovation,
further localism.
19
As for deregulation, a curious paradox should be noted. From a
formal point of view, it appears extremely difficult to introduce flexibility
among the tight web of institutional rules devoted to employee
protection, which make Italy one of the industrial countries with the
highest degree of employment rigidity. From an informal point of view,
the widespread evasion of juridical rules, particularly at the local level,
gives rise to high deregulation, or rather, to micro-regulation that is
arduous to control and to evaluate. To say which of the two realities is
more real, is an uneasy task. The link between the two systems of
regulation is complex and varies according to territory, firms and sector
                                                          
19 A better image for the Italian labour market, despite of considering it as the usual anomaly, is to
depict it as a «loosely coupled system» (Weick 1976), in which the different parts and the different actors,
though influencing one with the other, have rather independent behaviours; they are reciprocally
connected (so that a change in one part of the system affects the other parts) but not in a unilateral way.
Random changes, serendipities and sudden events are also understood as important variables. In this kind
of system, political parties, economic interest groups, national and local administrators try to pursue their
strategies in a complex game whose solution never approaches a zero-sum.26
of production. But it is probably this bundle, this mix of different
regulative regimes, which characterises the Italian labour market.
20
In a broad sense, it is possible to argue that the future acceptance
and expansion of innovative unemployment policies will very much
depend on their degree of institutional compatibility and on the
specific «combination of opportunities» which exist in the political
arena. The implementation of unorthodox programmes in the labour
market thus seems to require a political reorganisation in order to deal
with institutional reforms. Policies are path-dependent (we could say
«past-dependent») on their institutional context.
Their potential of innovation is somehow «genetically written» in
the old experiences and in the old configuration of labour
programmes. Although in their emergence they can be driven by
stochastic assumptions, the initial characteristics, once
institutionalised, are highly resilient. In this sector, institutional
change therefore has an incremental nature; it plays out as a
sequence of progressive local adjustments. Its course includes lock-in
effects (Arthur 1989) that condition from inside future alternatives and
directions.
The incentives produced by institutions encourage individuals to
adopt repetitive routines that can also become self-reinforcing
mechanisms. Their learning by doing forces them to stick to the old
routines and tend to frustrate sudden changes and big deviations. In
this genealogical model (as opposed to a teleological model of
explanation), policies are «carriers of history» (David 1992); in their
current structure it is possible to find out the deposits of past
programmes.
The point of this argument is not to establish a unilateral,
deterministic relationship between policies and institutions, but to
reflect on the nature of the links between the two variables in a specific
empirical situation, such as the one provided by the Italian labour
market. If the relevance of institutions in the evolution of policies has
been very much stressed, it was simply to highlight the dynamic and
                                                          
20 In regard to institutional reforms and qualification policies it must be said, on the contrary, that
there exist some interesting opportunities for innovation. It is worth noting that vocational training has
recently assumed high electoral salience, becoming one of the favourite areas of Romano Prodi, the neo-
leader of the centre-left coalition. Reforms, however, are still at a very preliminary stage.27
circular perspective where policies and politics should be collocated
21.
Institutions and policies evolve together and change together;
changes in one sphere provoke changes in the other sphere.
Individuals’ strategies and intentionality combine with and have to
take into account the presence of institutions, so much is evident from
this paper. Theoretical explanations have therefore to be searched in
the unstable equilibrium between actors’ strategic choices and
structures’ «inertial choices» (Pérez-Diaz and Rodriguez 1994) that
innovations paradoxically enact.
                                                          
21 On the relationship between institutions and policies in the new political economy see Hall
(1994).28
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